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The Decline of Formal Marriage:
Inevitable or Reversible?
MARSHA GARRISON*
I. Introduction
All over the industrialized world, marriage is in decline. Cohabitation,
which has waxed as marriage has waned, is a much less stable relational
form. In the United States, half of all cohabiting relationships dissolve
within eighteen months;' in both North America and Europe, children
born to cohabiting parents are two to four times more likely to experience
their parents' separation than are children born to married parents.2
Cohabitation is also a more variable relational form than marriage.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Research for this article was supported by the
Brooklyn Law School Faculty Fund.
1. See Patrick Heuveline & Jeffrey M. Timberlake, The Role of Cohabitation in Family
Formation: The United States in Comparative Perspective, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1214, 1223
tbl.2 (2004). Although the average duration of U.S. cohabitation does not appear to be increas-
ing (see Andrew J. Cherlin, Toward a New Home Socioeconomics of Union Formation, in THE
TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 126, 135 (Linda J. Waite ed.,
2000) [hereinafter THE TIES THAT BIND] (summarizing evidence)), the duration of cohabitation
may be increasing in some other countries. See Anne Barlow & Grace James, Regulating
Marriage and Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain, 67 MOD. L. REV. 143, 159 (2004) (noting
that 47% of all U.K. cohabitation relationships had endured five or more years in last national
survey).
2. See, e.g., Wendy Manning et al., The Relative Stability of Cohabiting and Marital Unions
for Children, 23 POPUL. RES. & POL'Y REV. 135 (2004) (finding that U.S. white, black and
Hispanic children born to cohabiting parents experience greater levels of instability than children
born to married parents and that white and Hispanic children whose cohabiting parents marry do
not experience the same levels of family stability as those born to married parents); Wendy
Manning & Ronald E. Bulanda, Cohabitation and Family Trajectories, in HANDBOOK OF
MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN FAMILY RESEARCH 199 (Sandra Hofferth & Lynne Casper eds., 2006)
(reporting that by age fourteen, three-fifths of children who lived with two cohabiting biological
parents experienced family change in contrast to only one-third of children who lived with two
married biological parents); R. Kelly Raley & Elizabeth Wildsmith, Cohabitation and Children's
Family Instability, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 210 (2004).
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Demographers have identified six or seven different cohabitational types,
ranging from a substitute for being single to a substitute for formal mar-
riage.3 Whereas marriage establishes "a social institution that rests upon
common values and shared expectations for appropriate behavior within
the partnership," cohabitational relationships lack "social blueprints" and
even a nomenclature; 4 cohabitation thus does not produce a consistent
meaning either for those within such a relationship or those outside it.5
Because of its relative instability and variability, cohabitation presents
public-policy and fact-finding challenges that formal marriage does not.
Because cohabitation is not invariably, or even typically, the equivalent of
marriage, many marital-status classifications appropriately divide the
married from the unmarried; however, because marital decision-making
may be affected by (dis)incentives produced by these classifications, pol-
icymakers face difficult choices in deciding whether, and to what extent,
they should revise statutory classifications to avoid marriage disincen-
tives.6 If the law allows cohabitants to show marital understandings in
order to obtain benefits associated with marital status, fact-based assess-
ment by some decisionmaker-with all the delay, expense, uncertainty,
and potential inconsistency that this entails-will be necessary. If the law
does not allow such a showing, potential inequity will result.7
The research evidence also shows that formal marriage is associated
with a range of health, wealth, and happiness benefits for both children
and adult partners. These benefits are concentrated in low-conflict, first
marriages; the socioeconomic and relational attributes of those who marry
also explain a considerable proportion of marital advantage. But the
3. See Heuveline & Timberlake, supra note 1, at 1216-18; Kathleen Kiernan, The Rise of
Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 15 INT'L J.L., POL'Y &
FAM. 1 (2001). See also Barlow & James, supra note 1, at 157-61 (quoting British cohabitants
describing range of reasons for cohabitation).
4. Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM.
ISSUES 53, 74 (1995) ("[C]ohabitation is an incomplete institution. No matter how widespread
the practice, nonmarital unions are not yet governed by strong consensual norms or formal laws.
... [T]there is no widely recognized social blueprint or script for the appropriate behavior of
cohabiters, or for the behavior of the friends, families, and other individuals and institutions
with whom they interact."). See also STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN'S LIVES (1998).
5. Nock, Comparison, supra note 4.
6. See Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Could We? Should We?, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
(2008) (reviewing evidence).
7. For a more detailed discussion of these problems, see Marsha Garrison, Is Consent
Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligations, 52 UCLA L. REV.
815, 848-54 (2005); Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters: What's Wrong with the ALI's
Domestic Partnership Proposal, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (Robin H. Wilson ed., 2006) [hereinafter
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY].
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evidence nonetheless suggests that the advantage is real and significant. 8
Because ceremonial marriage and childbearing within such unions
offer public advantages that informal unions do not, public policies
designed to encourage individuals to delay childbearing until marriage are
desirable. So are policies that encourage couples who have marital under-
standings to formalize their unions through ceremonial marriage. In order
to effectively design such policies, however, we need to understand why
formal marriage is in decline. This paper critically examines current eco-
nomic and cultural explanations for these phenomena. It then analyzes the
public-policy implications of the available evidence.
II. Why Marriage Matters
Formal marriage signals intention. It signals each partner who enters
into a new marital union, their friends, and their families.9 It also signals
strangers; those who meet or do business with the married couple under-
stand that each spouse has entered into a binding commitment that entails
expectations of fidelity, sharing, and lifetime partnership.' ° Formal mar-
riage also signals intention to the state; government officials can and do
assume that the married couple has undertaken obligations to each other
that both justify treating them as an economic unit and assuming that a
deceased spouse would want his or her marital partner to obtain the lion's
share of the decedent spouse's assets.''
Formal marriage accomplishes all of these signaling functions prospec-
tively, efficiently, and unequivocally. After a couple marries, there is no
question about what sort of relationship they intend. No litigation will be
necessary to determine their relational status. No decisionmaker will be
required to sift through heaps of self-serving testimony about individual
promises made and understandings reached. One partner cannot surprise
the other by bringing a fraudulent claim, nor can one partner surprise the
other by trying to evade a just claim.
Informal marriage lacks all of these merits. It must be proven and thus
offers only a retrospective status. Gaining that status will almost invari-
ably necessitate costly and time-consuming litigation.
8. See SECTION II, infra.
9. See Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as a Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (concluding that willingness to marry signals the under-
taking of a long-term, exclusive relational commitment); Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage,
Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 225.
10. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1901, 1907 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 256, 259-62 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert
E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1288-92 (1998).
11. See Garrison, supra note 6.
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These basic disadvantages of informal marriage are compounded by
the evidentiary problems inherent in fact-based determination of marital
status. Marital intent is subjective; when not publicly expressed, it is
extraordinarily hard to prove. This basic problem is exacerbated by the
range of meanings associated with cohabitation and the fact that cohabi-
tants often do not agree about the nature of their relationship. Researchers
have found that, in twenty to forty percent of cohabiting relationships,
partners express different views on whether they plan to marry each
other.' 2 Moreover, in one survey, about a third of the time, only one part-
ner felt that the couple spent a lot of time together, and in forty percent of
the cases, one partner, but not the other, reported a high degree of happi-
ness with the relationship.
13
Given the lack of uniformity in cohabitants' understandings and behav-
iors, the mere fact of living together provides little evidence of what
understandings a particular relationship has produced. One partner may
deeply believe that the relationship is committed; the other may deeply
believe the reverse. A breakup can only enhance such disagreement, set-
ting the stage for disappointed expectations and resulting litigation. These
difficulties are bad enough when both cohabitants are able to testify at a
hearing; they are even worse when the issue of marital understanding is
tested in a proceeding brought after one partner dies.
These various evidentiary problems have fueled the movement away
from the common-law-marriage doctrine. At one time, nearly two-thirds
of the states recognized common law marriage; by 2002, only twelve
jurisdictions did so,'4 and two of the twelve had adopted strict limitations
on its establishment."5 This decline reflects the sad fact that post-hoc, a
litigation-based determination of marital commitment often "leads to
fraud and uncertainty in the most important of human relationships."' 6
The evidentiary problems posed by the common-law-marriage doctrine
12. See Susan L. Brown, Union Transitions Among Cohabiters: The Significance of
Relationship Assessment and Expectations, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 833, 838 (2000) (about
20%); Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 913, 923 (1991) (same); Sharon Sassier & James McNally, Cohabiting
Couple's Economic Circumstances and Union Transitions: A Re-examination Using Multiple
Imputation Techniques, 32 Soc. Sci. REs. 553 (2004) (42%).
13. See Brown, supra note 12.
14. See HARRY E. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 87 (5th
ed. 2003).
15. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.402 (requiring affirmation of a common law marriage in
"declaration form"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (requiring establishment of a common law
marriage within one year of its dissolution).
16. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (2d
ed. 1987). See also Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REv. 709, 732-51 (1996).
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were minimized when nonmarital cohabitation was rare; they are mag-
nified in an era, like this one, in which cohabitation is extraordinarily
common and extremely variable in its meaning.
The uncertainty, cost, evidentiary, and rule-evasion problems inherent
in informal marriage justify state policies designed to encourage formal
marriage when a couple has reached a marital understanding. Informal
marriage cannot clearly, efficiently, and prospectively alter a couple's sta-
tus in accordance with their intentions; formal marriage can and does.
Formal marriage is also associated with a range of benefits to adult
partners and their children. Cross-national surveys show that marriage is
associated with higher levels of subjective well-being throughout the
industrialized and nonindustrialized world. 7 Researcher after researcher
has reported that married individuals typically live longer and healthier
lives than the unmarried; husbands and wives get more sleep, eat more
regularly, and visit the doctor more often; they abuse addictive substances
and engage in risky behaviors less frequently. 8 Married men and women
also do better economically than their unmarried counterparts. Married
17. See Ed Diener et al., Similarity of the Relations Between Marital Status and Subjective
Well-Being Across Cultures, 31 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 419 (2000) (finding, based on
forty-two-nation survey, that positive relationship between marital status and subjective well-
being did not differ by gender and was "very similar" across the world); Steven Stack & J. Ross
Eshleman, Marital Status and Happiness; A 17-Nation Study, 60 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 527
(1998) (finding that "married persons have a significantly higher level of happiness than persons
who are not married . . . independent of ... control variables including ones for sociodemo-
graphic conditions and national character." Although cohabitants had a higher level of happi-
ness than single persons, their happiness level was still "less than one quarter of [that] of mar-
ried persons.") See also Ping Qin, Suicide Risk in Relation to Socioeconomic, Demographic,
Psychiatric, and Familial Factors: A National Register-Based Study of All Suicides in
Denmark, 1981-1997, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 765 (2003) (reporting significantly higher risk of
suicide among single and cohabiting Danes, despite widespread acceptance of cohabitation in
Denmark). But see Kelly Musick & Larry Bumpass, Cohabitation, Marriage, and Trajectories
in Well-Being and Relationships (Calif. Ctr. Popul. Res. On-Line Working Paper Series 003-06,
2006), http://www.ccpr.ucla.edu/ccprwpseries/ccpr003-06.pdf (finding, in longitudinal study,
no difference between the effects of moving into marriage compared to cohabitation on happi-
ness and depression and only modest differences in health, self esteem, intergenerational rela-
tionships, and couple relationships that are small and appear to dissipate over time); Anke C.
Zimmermann & Richard A. Easterlin, Happily Ever After? Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce,
and Happiness in Germany, 32 POPUL. & DEV. REv. 511 (2006) (finding that life satisfaction of
individuals in intact marriages remained significantly higher than it was before marriage, but
that life satisfaction two or more years after marriage and life satisfaction in cohabiting unions
prior to marriage was not significantly different).
18. See LINDA WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED
PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETrER OFF FINANCIALLY 47--64 (2000) (summarizing
research); Ross Stolzenberg & Linda J. Waite, How Do Family and Work Affect Health and
Well-Being?: Marriage, Divorce, and Paid Employment, in WORK, FAMILY, HEALTH, AND
WELL-BEING (Suzanne Bianchi ed., 2005) (same); Amy Mehraban Pienta et al., Health
Consequences of Marriage for the Retirement Years, 21 J. FAM. ISSUES 559 (2000). However,
the evidence is conflicting on whether the married rate their health more highly than the unmar-
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men earn more than either single men or cohabitants.' 9 Married couples
also have a higher savings rate and thus accrue greater wealth than the
unmarried.2 °
The marital advantage also provides benefits to a couple's children.
Because of the greater stability that marriage provides, marital children
are exposed to many fewer financial, 21 physical, 2  and educational risks;23
these lower risks are associated with higher levels of well-being.24 There
is also evidence that the advantages conferred by marital childbearing and
rearing transcend the specific benefits associated with residential and eco-
nomic stability. For example, married fathers appear to be more involved
and spend more time with their children than unmarried fathers; if
fled. See Linda J. Waite, Trends in Men's and Women's Well-Being in Marriage, in THE TIES
THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 368. 375-79; Zheng Wu et al., "In Sickness and in Health ": Does
Cohabitation Count?, 24 J. FAM. ISSUES 811 (2003).
19. "[Tlhe general consensus in the literature is that controlling for other observable char-
acteristics, married men are simply more productive than unmarried men." Jeffrey S. Gray &
Michel J. Vanderhart, On the Determination of Wages: Does Marriage Matter?, in THE TIES
THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 356. Married men also tend to work longer hours and to choose
higher-paying jobs and professions. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 18, at 99-105;
Valerie K. Oppenheimer, Cohabiting and Marriage During Young Men's Career-Development
Process, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 127 (2003). The male "marriage premium" has declined, however,
for reasons that are poorly understood. See Philip N. Cohen, Cohabitation and the Declining
Marriage Premium for Men, 29 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 346 (2002).
20. See Joseph Lupton & James P. Smith, Marriage, Assets, and Savings, in MARRIAGE AND
THE ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 129 (Shoshana
Grossbard-Schechtman ed., 2003); Janet Wilmoth & Gregor Koso, Does Marital History
Matter? Marital Status and Wealth Outcomes Among Preretirement Adults, 64 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 254 (2002); Jay L. Zagorsky, Marriage and Divorce's Impact on Wealth, 41 J. Soc. 406
(2005).
21. See LYNNE M. CASPER & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 111-12 fig.4.3 (2002) (reporting, in 1998, 6.9% poverty rate for married-par-
ent households and 38.7% rate for single-mother households). Noncustodial divorced and
never-married parents are also less likely to pass wealth on to their adult children. See Frank F.
Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Effect of Divorce on Intergenerational Transfers: New Evidence, 32
DEMOGRAPHY 319 (1995); Nadine F. Marks, Midlife Marital Status Differences in Social
Support Relationships with Adult Children and Psychological Well-Being, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 5
(1995).
22. Rates of physical and sexual abuse are much higher when children live with an adult
stepparent or cohabitant. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the
ALI's Treatment of De Facto Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 7 (reviewing
evidence).
23. See Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, Father Absence and Child Well-Being:
A Critical Review, in THE FTrrURE Or THE FAMILY 116, 120-22 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds.,
2004) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OP THE FAMILY] (reviewing evidence); SARA MCLANAHAN &
GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 39-63
(1994) (same).
24. See Paul R. Amato & Jacob Cheadle, The Long Reach of Divorce: Divorce and Child
Well-Being Across Three Generations, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 191, 193 (2005) (summarizing
studies); Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 23, at 122-25 (same).
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parental separation occurs, they see their children more often and pay
child support more regularly.25 Living with married parents is also sig-
nificantly linked to age of sexual initiation, likelihood of having a teen
birth, and high school graduation, even after family instability is taken
into account.26 Indeed, the advantages of marriage appear to extend into a
child's adulthood and even to his or her children. Researchers have docu-
mented a strong link between growing up in a single-parent household and
adult income, health, and emotional stability. 27 A number of studies have
also found that both men and women who experience a single-parent
household as children are more likely, as adults, to experience marital dis-
cord and to divorce or separate.28
For both adults and children, the marital advantage is concentrated in
low-conflict relationships. Researchers have found that the continuation
of a high-conflict marriage is negatively associated with the health and
happiness;29 indeed, longitudinal surveys show that "parents' marital
25. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 21, at 46 (reporting that children whose parents
never married see their fathers less frequently after parental separation); MARCY CARLSON ET
AL., UNMARRIED BUT NOT ABSENT: FATHERS' INVOLVEMENT WITH CHILDREN AFTER A
NONMARITAL BIRTH (CRCW Working Paper 2005-07) (finding that parents' relationship status
at child's birth is key predictor of paternal involvement); Lingxin Hao, Family Structure,
Private Transfers, and the Economic Well-Being of Families with Children, 75 Soc. FORCES
269 (1996) (finding that married fathers were more likely to pay child support); Sandra L.
Hofferth & Kermyt G. Anderson, Are All Dads Equal? Biology Versus Marriage as a Basis for
Paternal Investment, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 213, 223-24 (2003) (finding that unmarried
fathers were significantly less involved with their children than married fathers). See also Susan
L. Brown, Family Structure and Child Well-Being: The Significance of Parental Cohabitation,
66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 351 (2004) (reporting that children living in cohabiting-parent families
experienced worse outcomes, on average, than those residing with married-parent families;
among children age six to eleven, economic and parental resources attenuated these differences,
but resources did not make a difference among adolescents age twelve to seventeen).
26. See Wendy E. Manning & Ronald D. Bulanda, Parental Cohabitation Experiences and
Adolescent Behavioral Outcomes (Bowling Green State Univ. Working Paper 06-15, 2006),
http://www.bgsu.edu/organizations/cfdr/research/pdf/2006/2006-15.pdf. See also Julie E. Artis,
Maternal Cohabitation and Child Well-Being Among Kindergarten Children, 69 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 222 (2007) (finding no differences in child well-being for children living in cohabiting
stepfamilies and cohabiting biological-parent households).
27. See Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 23, at 124-26 (reviewing research).
28. See PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA
OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 106-17 (1997) (summarizing studies); Amato & Cheadle, supra note 24,
at 192-93 (same). See also Chris Albrecht & Jay D. Teachman, The Childhood Living
Arrangements of Children and the Characteristics of Their Marriages, 25 J. FAM. ISSUES 86
(2004); Kathleen Kiernan, European Perspectives on Union Formation, in THE TIES THAT
BIND, supra note i, at 40, 55 tbl.3.8.
29. See Debra Umberson et al., You Make Me Sick: Marital Qualitv and Health Over the Life
Course, PRC Working Paper No. 03-04-05, 2005), http://www.prc.utexas.edu/working-papers/
wp.pdf/03-04-05.pdf (reviewing evidence); J.K. Kiecolt-Glaser & T.L. Newton, Marriage and
Health: His and Hers, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 472 (2001) (finding that unhappy marriages have
negative physical-health consequences). See also Catherine E. Ross et al., Reconceptualizing
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unhappiness and discord have a broad negative impact on virtually every
dimension of offspring well-being."3
Moreover, remarriage fails to confer the same advantage as a first mar-
riage.3 Sociologist Steven Nock found that while first marriage was asso-
ciated with significant gains in men's annual income, weeks worked, and
occupational prestige, remarriage was actually correlated with negative
economic consequences: men who remarried worked less, earned less,
and had less prestigious occupations than they did before their remar-
riages.32 Remarriage to a stepparent also fails to confer the same advan-
tages as a continuing marriage between the child's parents. Children liv-
ing in stepfamilies tend to score lower than children living in intact fami-
lies on tests of emotional and social well-being. Stepparents tend to be
less warm, less involved, and less active in children's lives than are bio-
logical parents in intact, marital households.33
Selection effects also explain away a significant portion of the marital
advantage. To the extent that those who marry are wealthier-or happier,
or healthier-before marriage, they should maintain these advantages
after marriage. Although the jury is still out on the extent to which the
marriage "premium" derives from preexisting characteristics or the mar-
ried state, we know that both marriage and marital parenting are strongly
associated with higher socioeconomic status
Having a child while single is three times as common for the poor as for the
affluent. Half of poor women who give birth while unmarried have no high
school diploma at the time, and nearly a third have not worked at all in the last
year.... And the situations of the men that father their children are not much
better. More than four in ten poor men who have a child outside of marriage
have already been to prison or jail by the time the baby is born; nearly half lack
Marital Status as a Continuum of Social Attachment, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 129 (1995) (find-
ing that individuals with unhappy relationships have higher distress levels than people without
partners).
30. AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 28, at 219.
31. See Umberson et al., supra note 29 (reviewing evidence).
32. See NOCK, supra note 4, at 66-82.
33. See MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 23; Hofferth & Anderson, supra note 25, at
223-24 (finding that stepfathers spent less time and were less involved with children than mar-
ried biological fathers); Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent Well-Being in
Cohabiting, Married, and Single-Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 877-78, 890
(2003) (reporting that neither cohabitation nor marriage to a nonparent is associated with uni-
form advantage in behavior or academic success among teenagers living in single-mother fam-
ilies); Susan D. Stewart, How the Birth of a Child Affects Involvement with Stepchildren, 67 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 461, 462 (2005) (summarizing research). Living with an unrelated adult
poses risks to children. See Michael N. Stiffman et al., Household Composition and Risk of
Fatal Child Maltreatment, 109 PEDIATRICS 615 (2002) (reporting that children residing in
households with an unrelated adult were eight times more likely to die of maltreatment than
children in households with two biological parents and that risk of maltreatment death was not
increased for children living with a sole biological parent).
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a high school diploma, and a quarter have no job.. . . [A]lmost half of them
earned less than $10,000 in the year before the birth.34
However, despite these caveats, the evidence strongly suggests that the
marital advantage is real, and that it persists across national, cultural, and
socioeconomic boundaries.35 Even in Scandinavia, which has the longest
experience with cohabitation as a mainstream family form, demographers
continue to find that marital childbearing is associated with much greater
childhood stability,36 smaller risks to youthful and adult well-being, 37 and
34. KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 2 (2005). See also GREGORY Acs & SANDY NELSON, SHOULD
WE GET MARRIED IN THE MORNING? A PROfiLE OF COHABITING COUPLES WITH CHILDREN 12,
tbl.2 (Urban Inst. Discussion Paper 04-01, 2004) (finding that cohabiting unmarried parents
were significantly less likely to work, to be high-school dropouts, and to be under age twenty-
five than married parents); ROBERT I. LERMAN, IMPACTS OF MARITAL STATUS AND PARENTAL
PRESENCE ON THE MATERIAL HARDSHIP OF FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 12 (Urban Institute, 2002)
(finding that 70% of married, two-parent families, 54% of cohabiting two-parent families, and
48% of single-parent families had an adult with more education than a high-school diploma);
CYNTHIA OSBORNE ET AL., INSTABILITY IN FRAGILE FAMILIES: THE ROLE OF RACE-ETHNICITY,
ECONOMICS, AND RELATIONSHIP QUALITY 7 (CRCW Working Paper 2004-17FF, 2004) (finding
that, in nationally representative sample, married parents reported almost twice the annual
income of cohabitants and less than 20% of married fathers had less than a high-school diplo-
ma as compared to almost two-fifths of cohabiting fathers); Wendy D. Manning & Daniel T.
Lichter, Parental Cohabitation and Children's Economic Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
998 (1996) (finding that unmarried fathers earned about half of what married fathers earned in
1990); K.A. Musick, Planned and Unplanned Childbearing Among Unmarried Women, 64 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 915 (2002) (reporting that level of education and socioeconomic status are
significant predictors of nonmarital birth); George R.G. Clark & Robert P. Strauss, Bell Curves
and Babies: The Interaction Between Ability, Welfare, and Nonmarital Childbearing,
Proceedings of Annual Conference of the National Tax Association, 2000, http://www.heinz.
cmu.edu/wpapers/detail.jsp;jsessionid=2370131110215112642?id= 187 (finding significant
association between nonmarital birth risk and scholastic achievement test scores).
35. See, e.g., Pamela J. Smock et al., The Effect of Marriage and Divorce on Women's
Economic Well-Being, 64 AM. Soc. REV. 794, 809 (1999) ("the economic benefits of marriage
are large, even above and beyond the characteristics of those who marry"); H.K. Kim & P.C.
McKenry, The Relationship Between Marriage and Psychological Well-Being-A Longitudinal
Analysis, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES 885 (2002) (data "confirmed the strong effects of marital status on
psychological well-being, supporting the protection perspective," indicated that "the transition
to cohabiting did not have the same beneficial effects as marriage for psychological well-being,"
and produced "weak and inconsistent" evidence of selection effects); Donna K. Ginther &
Madeline Zavodny, Is the Male Marriage Premium Due to Selection? The Effect of Shotgun
Weddings on the Return to Marriage, 14 J. POPUL. ECON. 313 (2001) ("at most 10% of the esti-
mated marriage premium [in men's wages] is due to selection").
36. See An-Magritt Jensen & Sten-Erik Clausen, Children and Family Dissolution in
Norway: The Impact of Consensual Unions, 10 CHILDHOOD 65 (2003) (finding that children of
cohabiting parents run a much higher risk of dissolution compared to children in marital unions
and that "this risk is not diminishing as cohabitation becomes more widespread"); Kathleen
Kiernan, Unmarried Cohabitation and Parenthood: Here to Stay? European Perspectives, in
THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at 84 fig.3.6 (showing that 6% of Swedish marital
unions and 25% of nonmarital unions dissolve within five years after the birth of a first child).
37. See Gunilla Ringback Weitoft et al., Mortality, Severe Morbidity, and Injury in
Children Living with Single Parents in Sweden: A Population-Based Study, 361 LANCET 289
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lower rates of divorce and nonmarital childbearing. 38 For example, in
Sweden, where state policies "tend to view cohabitation as equal to mar-
riage, and many of the regulations of marriage are applied to cohabiting
relationships, 39 cohabiting parents are more than four times as likely as
married parents to separate before their first child turns five.n0 And despite
an extraordinarily high level of public assistance to single parents-assis-
tance that produces a child poverty rate of less than three percent 4 -sin-
gle parenthood remains a serious risk factor for children. The most com-
pelling study, which analyzed almost a million cases and took account of
possibly confounding factors such as socioeconomic status and parental
mental health, found that Swedish children in single-parent households
showed significantly increased risks of "all adverse outcomes analyzed,
including psychiatric disease, suicide or suicide attempt, injury, and
addiction. '42 There is also evidence that, even after controlling for observ-
able characteristics like education, academic test scores, and premarital
pregnancy, marriage contributes significantly to living standards, "not
only relative to single parents living alone but also compared to parents
in cohabiting relationships and single parents living with other adult
relatives., 43 As family sociologist Paul Amato has put it, "the evidence
(2003); Jan 0. Jonsson & Michael Gabler, Family Dissolution, Family Reconstitution, and
Children's Educational Careers: Recent Evidence for Sweden, 34 DEMOGRAPHY 277, 287
(1997) (finding that even after controlling for all independent variables, children of divorced
and separated parents and children living in reconstituted families have low school-continuation
propensities compared to children living with both biological parents); Helen Hansagi et al.,
Parental Divorce: Psychosocial Well-Being, Mental Health and Mortality During Youth and
Young Adulthood: A Longitudinal Study of Swedish Conscripts, 10 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 335
(2000) (reporting that in a group of Swedish conscripts, several indicators of low levels of well-
being and mental illness, including alcoholism, were significantly correlated with parental
divorce even after adjustment for antecedents and other factors). See also Taru H. Makikyro et
al., Hospital-Treated Psychiatric Disorders in Adults with a Single-Parent and Two-Parent
Family Background: A 28-Year Follow-Up of the 1966 Northern Finland Cohort, 37 FAM.
PROCESS 335 (1998).
38. See Kathleen Kiernan, Redrawing the Boundaries of Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
980, 983 (2004).
39. See Kristen R. Heimdal & Sharon K. Houseknecht, Cohabiting and Married Couples'
Income Organization: Approaches in Sweden and the United States, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
525, 527 (2003).
40. See Kiernan, supra note 28, at 84 fig.3.6.
41. See UNICEF, A LEAGUE TABLE OF CHILD POVERTY IN RICH NATIONS 4 fig. 1 (Innocenti
Report Card No. 1, 2000), http://www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/repcard I e.pdf.
42. Weitoft et al., supra note 37.
43. LERMAN, supra note 34, at 32. See also Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Love and
Money? The Impact of Family Structure on Family Income, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 57 (2005);
OSBORNE ET AL., supra note 34 at 12-13 (CRCW Working Paper 2004-17FF, 2004) (finding in
nationally representative study that even after controlling for the "mother's characteristics, par-
ents' fertility history, the couple's economic characteristics, and relationship quality. ...
[p]arents who are cohabiting at their child's birth still have over twice the odds of separation as
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consistently indicates that children with two happily and securely married
parents have a statistical advantage over children raised in other family
groups." And "[b]ecause we all have an interest in the well-being of chil-
dren, it is reasonable for social institutions (such as the state) to attempt to
increase the proportion of children raised by married parents with satisfy-
ing and stable marriages.""
In sum, formal marriage is associated with a wide range of public and
private benefits. These benefits support public policies designed to
encourage formal registration of marital intentions and childbearing with-
in formalized relationships.
Il. Marital Decline
Despite the advantages associated with formal marriage, all across the
industrialized world young adults are marrying later45 and increasing
numbers may not marry at all.46 With the notable exceptions of Asia and
southern Europe, the proportion of children born outside of marriage has
also skyrocketed. 7
compared to parents who are married. ); Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 23, at
126-30, 130 (analyzing selection effects and finding that they "do not account for all the dif-
ferences in children, families, and subsequent outcomes.")
44. Paul Amato, Tension Betveen Institutional and Individual Views of Marriage, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 959, 962-63 (2004).
45. Between 1950 and 2002, the median age at first marriage increased for U.S. men by 4.1
years (from 22.8 to 26.9) and for women by 5 years (from 20.3 to 25.3). See http://www.info-
please.com/ipa/A0005061.html (citing U.S. census data). See also Kathleen Kiernan, European
Perspectives, supra note 1, at 41 tbl.3.1 (reporting increase in age of first marriage in most
European nations); J. Sean Curtin, Japanese Marriage Trends in 2002: Later Unions and More
Divorce Families, Social Trends: Series No. 9, http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/APCITYJUNPAN016635.pdf (reporting "all time high" in Japanese age at first mar-
riage of twenty-seven for women and twenty-nine for men in 2002).
46. Between 1970 and 2002, the proportion of U.S. adults age 40-44 who reported that they
had never been married increased among men from 4.9% to 16.7% and among women from
6.3% to 11.5%. See http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0763219.html (citing U.S. census data).
See also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2001 59
tbl.68 (showing that, between 1950 and 1996, the U.S. marriage rate declined from 11.1 to 8.8
per 1000 population); Marriages and Divorces in the EU (1960-95), http://www.eurohealth.ie/
newrep/socio.htm (showing average decline, between 1960 and 1995, of 24% in marriage rate
of fifteen European nations).
47. See Stephanie J. Ventura & Christine Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United
States 1940-99, 48 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. No. 16, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr
48/nvs48_16.pdf (reporting that 33.8% of U.S. births were nonmarital in 2002, compared to
3.8% in 1940); Timothy M. Smeeding et al., The Challenge of Family System Changes for
Research and Policy, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at 1, 8 fig.l.3 (showing
increases in European nonmarital birth rates between 1960 and 2000). In the United States, the
increase in nonmarital births reflects a large increase in premarital sex. The National Survey of
Family Growth found that, in 1970, 40% of unmarried eighteen-year-old women said that they
had engaged in sexual intercourse. By 1988, the proportion had risen to 70%. This trend has
502 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 41, Number 3, Fall 2007
The decline of marriage and marital childbearing is not evenly distrib-
uted across the population, however. College-educated women were once
less likely to marry than others; this is no longer the case 48 and, at least in
the United States, these well-educated women are equally or more likely
to stay married than they were several decades ago.49 In the United States
and, to a lesser extent, some European nations, nonmarital fertility is also
concentrated among the poorly educated. 50 Because of these divergent
trends, in the mid-1990s, only 10% of the children of U.S. college-edu-
cated women lived in single-parent households-a percentage that has not
increased since 1980-as compared with more than 40% of children
whose mothers lacked a high-school diploma.51
Marital and reproductive behavior also diverges sharply by race and
ethnicity. In the United States, the decline of marriage has been much
reversed in recent years, and in 1995 the proportion of eighteen-year-old women who reported
having had sex fell to 63%. See Douglas Besharov & Karen Gardiner, Trends in Teen Sexual
Behavior, 19 CHILD & YOUTH SERV. REV. 328 (1997), http://www.aei.org/publications/publD.
17756/pub-detail.asp.
48. See Joshua R. Goldstein & Catherine T. Kenney, Marriage Delayed or Marriage
Forgone? New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriage for U.S. Women, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 506
(2001).
49. See David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in
the United States Since 1960, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at 25, 39-40 fig.2.2,
42-43 fig.2.1 I (reporting marriage as equally likely); David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks,
The Uneven Spread of Single Parent Families: What Do We Know? Where Do We Look for
Answers?, in Soc. INEQUALITY 3, 13-14 figs. l.4 & 1.5 (Kathryn M. Neckerman eds., 2004)
(showing historical data on single motherhood by education level) [hereinafter Ellwood &
Jencks, Uneven Spread]; Dan Hurley, Divorce Rate: It's Not as High as You Think, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2005, at D7 (reporting unpublished data showing that the ten-year divorce rate for col-
lege graduates "has plummeted to just over 16% of those married between 1990 and 1994 from
27% of those married between 1975 and 1979"). See also Steven P. Martin, Women's Education
and Family Timing, in Soc. INEQUALITY, supra at 79, 94, tbl.2.2 (showing, between 1970 and
1990, 1.8 year mean decline in age at first birth for U.S. women without high-school diploma
and 6.3 year gain for women with a master's or professional degree).
50. See Kathleen Kiernan, European Perspectives on Nonmarital Childbearing, in OUT OF
WEDLOCK: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF NONMARITAL FERTILITY, 77, 90 tbl.3.5 (Lawrence L.
Wu & Barbara Wolfe eds., 2004) (showing higher proportion of nonmarital first births to non-
graduates in four of nine European nations); Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 49, at 41-42 fig.2.9
(reporting that about a quarter of U.S. women without a high-school degree have had children
but never married; only about 3% of college-educated women have done so. See also Larry
Bumpass & H.H. Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children's Family Contexts
in the United States, 54 POPUL. STUD. 29 (2000) (reporting that U.S. college-educated women
produce less than 5% of U.S. nonmarital births); K.A. Musick, Planned and Unplanned
Childbearing Among Unmarried Women, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 915 (2002) (reporting that
education level and socioeconomic status are among the best predictors of nonmarital birth).
51. See Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 49, at 36-39 fig.2.7. About 60% of marriages of
women without high-school degrees and 33% of marriages of college graduates end in separa-
tion or divorce. See Kelly Raley & Larry Bumpass, The Topography of the Divorce Plateau:
Levels and Trends in Union Stability in the United States after 1980, 8 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 245
(2003).
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more pronounced among black than white Americans. Blacks have long
had a high rate of marital disruption,5 2 but they are now much less likely
to marry, too. Slightly more than two-thirds of black women born between
1960 and 1964 married by age forty, compared to eighty-seven percent of
those born two decades earlier and eighty-nine percent of non-Hispanic
white women. 53 Conversely, sixty-eight percent of black children are now
born outside of marriage, compared to twenty-eight percent of non-
Hispanic white children. 54 Black cohabitants are also much less likely
than white cohabitants to marry after their child's birth or even to remain
a couple. 55 As a result of these various trends, black children spend con-
siderably more time than white children in single-parent families. Indeed,
the chance of a black child growing up with both parents was higher dur-
ing slavery than it is today.56
Despite these socioeconomic and ethnic differences--explored at
greater length in Professor Wax's contribution to this symposium-mar-
riage remains, at least in the United States, an important life goal that is
shared by virtually all sectors of the population. Overwhelmingly, young
Americans assert that they would be "more economically secure, have
more emotional security, a better sex life, and a higher standard of living"
if they were married.57 They report that they plan to marry themselves and
52. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD 60-62 (1998) (showing marital disruption
rates by ethnicity); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: How OUR CULTURE HAS
WEAKENED FAMILIES (2002) (reporting historical data on African-American marital disruption
rates and noting that in earlier periods some unmarried mothers "reported themselves as wid-
ows in order to explain why they had a child but not a husband"); Ellwood & Jencks, supra note
49, at 42 fig.2. 10 (showing marital disruption rates of mothers by ethnicity); Martin, supra note
49 at, figs.2.17 & 2.18 (showing marriage and birth rates for black women between 1940 and
1995).
53. See Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 49, at 40-41 fig.2.8 (reporting that, at age 40, 89%
of white and 68% of black women were married and 80% of white and 85% of black women
had had children).
54. See U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
2004-05 60, tbl.71. Variation by race is even larger for first births; 74% of the first births of
non-Hispanic white women are marital, as compared to 23% of first births to black women. See
ANJANI CHANDRA ET AL., FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF
U.S.WOMEN: DATA FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH fig.5 (Vital & Health
Statistics Series 23 No. 25, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf.
55. See SARA McLANAHAN, FRAGILE FAMILIES AND THE MARRIAGE AGENDA 7 & tbl.5 (Ctr.
Res. on Child Well-Being Working Paper 03-16-FF, 2003) (finding in nationally representative
sample, that 21% of cohabiting couples and 11% of visiting but "romantically involved" cou-
ples had married by the time of their child's third birthday, while 10% of married, 38% of
cohabiting, and 51% of "visiting" couples had separated by this birthday.) See also Cynthia
Osborne, Marriage Following the Birth of a Child Among Cohabiting and Visiting Parents, 67
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 14 (2005) (reporting that different variables predict marriage for visitors
and cohabitants).
56. See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 110 (rev. ed. 1992).
57. See Kelly Raley, Recent Trends and Differentials in Marriage and Cohabitation, in THE
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say that a good marriage is an important component of a good life.58 This
enthusiasm for marriage has not declined. Annual surveys of high school
seniors conducted since the late 1970s show virtually identical percentages
reporting that "having a good marriage and family life" is extremely
important; the proportion of young men reporting that they plan to marry
has actually increased.59 Support for marriage is high within all ethnic and
racial groups,6° and both cohabitants6 and unmarried parents62 seem to be
just as enthusiastic as the general population. Support for marriage is not
as high outside the United States, but the perception that marriage is an
important social institution still seems to be shared by a substantial major-
ity of adults.63
TIES THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 20, 34 (reporting that most adults age twenty to twenty-nine
say that they would be happier, "more economically secure, have more emotional security, a
better sex life, and a higher standard of living if they were married"); Arland Thornton & L.
Young-DeMarco, Four Decades of Trends in Attitudes toward Family Issues in the United
States: The 1960s Through the 1990s, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1009 (2001) (concluding that
young Americans continue to favor marriage).
58. See Thornton & Young-DeMarco, supra note 57 (stating that about 80% of young
women and 78% of young men report that they plan to marry).
59. Id. See also William G. Axinn & Arland Thornton, The Transformation in the Meaning
of Marriage, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 147, 151-52 tbl.8.1 (reporting survey data
from 1970s to 90s on attitudes toward marriage).
60. See M. Belinda Tucker, Marital Values and Expectations in Context, in THE TIES THAT
BIND, supra note 1, at 177-80 & tbl.9.3 (reporting marital value means by gender and ethnicity).
61. See John D. Cunningham & John K. Antill, Cohabitation and Marriage: Retrospective
and Predictive Comparisons, II J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 77 (1994); Meredith J. Porter
et al., Cohabitors' Prerequisites for Marriage: Individual, Relationship, and Sociocultural
Influences (Bowling Green State Univ. Working Paper 2004-09) (finding that among surveyed
cohabitants, "cohabitation is not viewed as an alternative to marriage [and] ... [o]nly a very
small percentage has no desires or plans to ever marry.") See also Andrew J. Cherlin, Toward
a New Home Socioeconomics of Union Formation, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 135
("The typically short durations in the United States, along with expressed preferences for mar-
riage, suggest that marriage is still the goal for most young adults and cohabitation is still seen
as an intermediate status.")
62. See GREGORY Acs & HEATHER KOBALL, TANF AND THE STATUS OF TEEN MOTHERS
UNDER AGE 17 fig.7 (Urban Inst. Series A, No. A-62, 2003) http://www.urban.org/Uploaded
PDF/310796_A-62.pdf (reporting that over 80% of unmarried mothers and 90% of unmarried
fathers agreed with the statement "marriage is better for children" and that a majority said that
their chances of marriage were "good or almost certain"); CHRISTINA GIBSON-DAVIS ET AL.,
HIGH HOPES BUT EVEN HIGHER EXPECTATIONS: THE RETREAT FROM MARRIAGE AMONG Low-
INCOME COUPLES tbl.3 (Ctr. Research Child Welfare Working Paper 03-06-ff, 2003) (reporting
that, in nationally representative Fragile Families survey, 79% of unmarried mothers and 84%
of unmarried fathers living together at child's birth say that there is at least a "good or certain"
chance that they will marry); Kathryn Edin et al., A Peek Inside the Black Box: What Marriage
Means for Poor Unmarried Parents, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1007, 1010 (2004) (reporting data
from Fragile Families Study showing that two-thirds of new unmarried mothers and three-
quarters of new unmarried fathers agreed with the statement "marriage is better for children").
63. See Andrew Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, 15 FUTURE
OF CHILD. 33 (2005) (reporting that in a World Values Survey conducted between 1999 and
2001, only 10% of adult Americans agreed with the statement, "Marriage is an outdated insti-
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IV. The Determinants of Marital Decline
If marriage remains an important life goal, an obvious question is why
formal marriage is in decline. We know that marital and childbearing
behavior has undergone similar transformations in the past. For example,
family historian Lawrence Stone reports that, in England, between 1690
and 1760 the "old moral controls on bundling" deteriorated, resulting in a
tripling of the nonmarital portion of first births and an "even more star-
tling explosion of pre-nuptial conceptions."
By the late eighteenth century consummation and conception normally preced-
ed-and indeed precipitated-marriage, as shown by the fact that a third of all
brides were pregnant on their wedding-day, and over half of all first births were
conceived out of wedlock. 64
But why did controls on "bundling" decline during the eighteenth cen-
tury? Why did they revive in the nineteenth? And why have they again
declined in recent years?
Looking at recent developments, family sociologists have noted that, at
least in the United States, the meaning of marriage seems to have shifted,
with marriage increasingly viewed as a marker of achievement. Andrew
Cherlin, for example, argues that marriage "has evolved from a marker of
conformity to a marker of prestige, '65 Pamela Smock urges that today's
marriage "signifies that one is no longer struggling economically, ' 66 and
Maria Kefalas et al. find that "[i]n years past, being married meant you
were an adult, [but] today you have to be an adult to be married. 67
In support of this attitudinal shift, Cherlin and Smock cite survey evi-
dence showing overwhelming support for the proposition "[i]t is extreme-
ly important for you to be economically set before you get married ' 68 and
Kefalas et al. offer detailed interview data evidencing similar attitudes
toward marriage. None of these experts offers comparative data, and the
tution," as compared with 22% of Canadians, 26% of British, and 36% of French adults, and
that support for marriage was highest in the U.S. and Iceland).
64. LAWRENCE STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS AND BROKEN LIVES: INTIMATE AND REVEALING
ACCOUNTS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 20 (1995).
65. Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 848, 855 (2004).
66. Pamela J. Smock, The Wax and Wane of Marriage: Prospects for Marriage in the 21st
Century, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 966, 968 (2004) [hereinafter Smock, Wax and Wane]. See also
Pamela J. Smock et al., "Everything's There Except Money": How Money Shapes Decisions to
Marry Among Cohabitors, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 680 (2005).
67. Maria Kefalas et al., Marriage Is More Than Being Together: The Meaning of Marriage
Among Young Adults in the United States, Network on Transitions to Adulthood Research
Network Working Paper, 2005. See also Barlow & James, supra note I, at 158 (reporting that
in interviews with U.K. cohabitants "the cost of a 'proper wedding"' was "commonly" noted as
a "reason for choosing to cohabit rather than marry.")
68. Cherlin, supra note 65, at 856; Smock, supra note 66, at 968-69.
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capacity to support a family has long been a factor in male marriage deci-
sion-making. But assuming that there has been a significant attitudinal
shift, the question remains: Why?
One set of explanations relies on economic theory. Professor Gary
Becker's path-breaking economic model of marriage posits benefits from
marital role specialization much like those that flow from international
trade; it thus predicts that factors that diminish the incentive to specialize,
for example a convergence in male and female wages, will produce
diminished gains from marriage and a lower marriage rate.69 Some econ-
omists, expanding on Becker's theory, have posited additional economic
gains from marriage that flow from its potential for pooling risk and rais-
ing living standards through joint consumption of shared goods.7 °
Economic models also emphasize the importance of sex ratios: if women
are in relatively short supply, the models predict a higher marriage rate; if
men are in short supply, they predict a lower marriage rate.71 Finally, the
models predict that the availability of economic support, like public assis-
tance from outside the family, will make marriage less attractive and thus
reduce the marriage rate within affected population groups.72
Empirical researchers have charted many of the correlations predicted
by economic theory. A number of studies have shown that higher male
earnings and income prospects are positively associated with marriage,73
and there is evidence that low ratios of men to women are indeed corre-
lated with low marriage rates.74 Researchers have also consistently found
that marriage rates tend to decline during periods of economic hardship
that drive down employment and earnings, while divorce rates increase.75
69. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 14-37 (1981). See also CASPER &
BIANCHI, supra note 21, at xxvi-xxviii (summarizing economic theories); Ellwood & Jencks,
supra note 49, at 45 (same).
70. See Robert A. Moffitt, Female Wages, Male Wages, and the Economic Model of
Marriage: The Basic Evidence, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 302, 304; Yoram
Weiss, The Formation and Dissolution of Families: Why Marry? Who Marries Whom? And
What Happens Upon Divorce?, in HANDBOOK OF POPULATION AND FAMILY ECONOMICS (Mark
R. Rosenzweig & Oded Stark eds., 1997).
71. See SHOSHANA GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, ON THE ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE: A THEORY
OF MARRIAGE, LABOR, AND DIVORCE 62-63, 69-70, 87-101 (1993); Ellwood & Jencks, supra
note 49, at 45.
72. See Moffitt, supra note 70, at 305. Economists do not agree on whether these econom-
ic benefits predict more marriage at lower or higher income levels.
73. See GROSSBARD-SCHECHTMAN, supra note 71, at 66-67 (summarizing studies); Smock
et al., supra note 66, at 682-83 tbl. 1 (listing studies); David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks,
The Uneven Spread of Single Parent Families: What Do We Know? Where Do We Look for
Answers, in Soc. INEQUALITY (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004) (summarizing studies).
74. See GROSSBARD-SCHECHTMAN, supra note 71, at 91-101 (summarizing studies);
Ellwood & Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single Parent Families, supra note 73 (same).
75. See Ellwood & Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single Parent Families, supra note 73,
(summarizing research); Lynn White & Stacy J. Rogers, Economic Circumstances and Family
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Couples themselves also describe economic factors as important con-
siderations in the decision to marry. In the interviews conducted by
Kefalas et al., financial problems were frequently mentioned as impedi-
ments to formal marriage. As one interviewee put it,
Marriage is something you earn ... If [she] graduates and [1] graduate, you can
start working and we can afford [a wedding] and that's when you get married.
It's not just cause we have a child and all of a sudden we need to go out and
do it.
7 6
Similarly, in a British survey, a number of cohabitants described "the cost
of a 'proper wedding"' as a factor that had deterred them from marrying.
77
Economic theory cannot explain the magnitude of the recent decline in
marriage, however. Researchers who measured the impact of changing
economic conditions on the U.S. marriage rate between 1986 and 1997
found that wage and employment shifts explained only about a third of the
decline during that period.78 The U.S. retreat from marriage also continued
throughout the 1990s, despite dramatic increases in economic growth.79
And, contrary to economic theory, the evidence on both the impact of
women's economic opportunities and external supports like public assis-
tance is ambiguous: well-educated women with larger economic opportu-
nities appear to marry later than their less advantaged counterparts, but
they do not seem less likely to marry over the life course." Nor does
public assistance appear to have a consistent impact on marital behavior.8
Outcomes: A Review of the 1990s, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1035 (2000) (same).
76. Kefalas et al., supra note 67.
77. See Barlow & James, supra note 1.
78. See Daniel T. Lichter et al., Economic Restructuring and the Retreat from Marriage, 31
Soc. Sci. RES. 230 (2002).
79. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 46, at 88 tbl. 113 (showing U.S. marriage rate of
9.8 per 1000 in 1990 and 8.2 per 1000 in 2001).
80. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 21, at 273-74 (summarizing evidence); Ellwood &
Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single Parent Families, supra note 49 (same); M.M. Sweeney,
Two Decades of Family Change: The Shifting Economic Foundations of Marriage, 67 AM. Soc.
REV. 132 (2002). As Professor Wax explains in her contribution to this symposium, the "tech-
nology shock" theory propounded by George Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock
Childbearing in the United States, Il1 Q. J. ECON. 279 (1996) fails to explain why the decline
of marriage is disproportionately concentrated in some racial and ethnic groups. It also fails to
explain the significant cross-national variation in nonmarital birth rates.
81. See Ellwood & Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single-Parent Families, supra note 73, at
47-51 (summarizing literature); LIBERTAD GONZALEZ, THE EFFECT OF BENEFITS ON SINGLE
MOTHERHOOD [N EUROPE: EVIDENCE FROM THE ECHP (IZA Conference on Women & Labor
Market in Europe (Dec. 2004), http://www.iza.org/conference-files/wlme2004/gonzalez_11291.
pdf (reporting significant positive effect of public benefits on single motherhood and headship in
Western Europe); Marcy Carlson et al., The Effects of Welfare and Child Support Policies on
Union Formation, 23 POPUL. RES. & POL'Y REV. 513 (2004) (finding that higher welfare
benefits discourage couples from breaking up, while strong child support enforcement reduces
the chances that unmarried parents will marry); E. Michael Foster & Saul D. Hoffman, The
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Economic theory also suffers from methodological limitations that cur-
tail its explanatory value. Existing economic models cannot predict either
the magnitude of income effects or the interaction between economic vari-
ables. And economic theorists have largely failed to offer an explanation
for the uncoupling of marriage and parenting, perhaps the most dramatic
and notable of recent demographic trends.82 As a result of these various
limitations, we can point to changing income and employment patterns as
sources of the decline in marriage and marital fertility, but we cannot
use these patterns to predict future trends or even to fully explain current
outcomes.
Of course, economic analysis is not the only way of explaining the
decline of marriage. Another set of explanations stresses new legal and
cultural norms-legal abortion, no-fault divorce, the abandonment of
legal disabilities associated with illegitimacy, greater tolerance of pre- and
nonmarital sexuality and childbearing-as a source of marriage's
decline.83 Certainly these shifts are associated with vastly altered attitudes
toward sexual and reproductive behavior;84 it would be surprising if they
did not have some impact on marriage behavior as well.
However, cultural explanations are no more capable than economic
theory of fully explaining the decline in marriage. Like economic theory,
cultural explanations of marriage behavior can do little more than predict
the direction of change; they do not even purport to explain how cultural
variables interact or the magnitude of a culturally induced behavioral shift."
Cultural explanations are also difficult to test empirically. For example,
researchers have been debating the impact of no-fault divorce grounds on
divorce rates for the past generation. It is clear that divorce rates rose fol-
lowing the introduction of no-fault in the late 1960s and 1970s. It is also
clear that divorce rates had been rising for the entire century that preced-
Young and the Not Quite So Young: Age Variation in the Impact of AFDC Benefits on
Nonmarital Childbearing, in OUT OF WEDLOCK, supra note 50 at 173, 194-96 (concluding that
variation in models depends on whether "state fixed effects" are included in analysis).
82. See Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 49, at 48-49; V. Joseph Hotz et al., The Economics
of Fertility in Developed Countries, in HANDBOOK OF POPULATION AND FAMILY ECONOMICS,
supra note 70; Valerie K. Oppenheimer, Women's Employment and the Gain to Marriage: The
Specializing and Trading Model, 23 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 431 (1997).
83. See Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 49, at 52-56 (summarizing theories); Ellwood &
Jencks, The Uneven Spread, supra note 73, at 51-60 (same).
84. See Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States,
51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 873 (1989) (reporting that in a 1965 survey, 69% of women under age
30 said that it was "always" or "almost always" wrong if a woman "has intimate relations with
a man to whom she is engaged and intends to marry"; by 1974, only 24% said it was wrong "to
have sex relations before marriage." See also CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 21, at 42-43;
Axinn & Thornton, supra note 59, at 148-50.
85. See Smock, Wax and Wane, supra note 66, at 967 (describing impossibility of empiri-
cally testing causal role of social change in producing retreat from marriage).
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ed this legal innovation. 86 Did the advent of no-fault contribute signifi-
cantly to the preexisting trend? Most observers have found that it did in
the short-run, but over the long run there is no agreement whatsoever;
some researchers argue in favor of independent effects, whereas others
argue that divorce reforms had no long-term impact and were themselves
the product of a longer-term cultural shift.87
The no-fault divorce example is not unique; legal and cultural norms
often change rapidly and in tandem, just as they did during the 1960s and
1970s. Cultural theories offer no method of determining which norms
drive change and which simply follow the trend. 88 Nor are they capable of
establishing the timing and duration of a culturally induced behavioral
shift. For example, U.S. attitudes toward marriage and divorce changed
sharply between the mid-60s and mid-70s, but since then have varied
hardly at all.89 It is not obvious that an attitudinal shift ending in the 1970s
had the capacity to significantly affect either the continued rise of divorce
rates through the 1980s or the ongoing rise of cohabitation, which contin-
ues even today on an upward course.
Looking at population subgroups does not seem to expand the explana-
tory power of either economic or cultural theories. Demographers have
been no more successful in explaining the extraordinarily low marriage
rate of black Americans than they have been in explaining the general
decline of marriage. Again, economic factors have some explanatory
power and considerable intuitive appeal; 90 almost a quarter of prime-age
86. Ellwood & Jencks, supra note 49.
87. Compare Norval Glenn, Further Discussion of the Effects of No-Fault Divorce on
Divorce Rates, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 800 (1999), and Ira Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Dissolving
the Relationship Between Divorce Rates and Divorce Laws, 18 INT'L J. EcON. 341 (1998), with
Douglas W. Allen, The Impact of Legal Reforms on Marriage and Divorce, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 191 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002),
and Rogers et al., Did No-Fault Divorce Legislation Matter? Definitely Yes and Sometimes No,
61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 803 (1999). See also Justin Wolfers, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws
Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 1802 (2006) (con-
cluding that the divide in the no-fault divorce research reflects a failure to jointly consider the
dynamic response of divorce rates to a "policy shock" and finding that, with this effect consid-
ered, liberalized divorce laws caused a discernible rise in divorce rates for about a decade, "with
much of this effect concentrated in the first few years," that the data do not permit rejection of
"either moderately positive or moderately negative [long-term] changes," and that none of the
estimates "suggest that unilateral divorce laws can explain much of the rise in the divorce rate
over the past half century").
88. See Smock, Wax and Wane, supra note 66, at 967 (explaining that cultural explanations
of marriage behavior "can probably never be adequately tested as causal forces").
89. See Axinn & Thornton, supra note 59.
90. The economic explanations rely heavily on the relatively low employment rate and poor
economic prospects of African-American men. For example, Professor William Julius Wilson,
has argued that women seek husbands among the group of men with good economic prospects,
and that shifts in job-skill requirements and pay has produced a dearth of good-husband mate-
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black men are unemployed throughout the year9' and another twelve per-
cent are incarcerated. 92 But economic models have in fact proven less
capable of explaining marital trends among black than white Americans: 93
male earnings appear to have a larger effect on the marriage decisions of
whites than on blacks; 94 some studies have also found that increases in
female earnings are associated with declines in marriage for white, but not
black females. 95 Cultural explanations are also incapable of fully explain-
ing the racial divide in marriage behavior. Most of the cultural models
posit blacks' low rate of marital success and high rate of nonmarital child-
bearing as part of the legacy of slavery. Black scholar W.E.B. Du Bois
proposed this theory at the turn of the century; 96 although its adoption by
Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the 1 960s spurred considerable controversy,9
7
it has been revived and reinvigorated in recent years by Professor Orlando
Patterson and others. 98 The Du Bois-Moynihan hypothesis relies on the
fact that slavery often prevented a man from being an effective husband
and father; it posits the development of a "uterine society" in which men
were emasculated and children, women, and even men predominantly
turned to mothers and other female relatives for help.99 Like economic the-
rial among African-American men. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS:
THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
91. See ANDREW SUM ET AL., TRENDS IN BLACK MALE JOBLESSNESS AND YEAR-ROUND
IDLENESS: AN EMPLOYMENT CRISIS IGNORED 15-16, ch. 6 (Northeastern Univ. Ctr. Labor Market
Studies, 2004), http://www.nlc.org/ASSETS/223BA7C42D964A32A2CAC31E28DDF
AFC/IYEFDYBlackMalesReport.pdf. See generally PROSPERITY FOR ALL?: THE ECONOMIC
BOOM AND AFRICAN AMERICANS (Robert Cherry & William M. Rodgers III eds., 2000).
92. See Nation's Inmate Population Increased 2.3 Percent Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2006, at A14.
93. See Moffitt, supra note 70. See also Daniel Lichter et al., Race and the Retreat from
Marriage: A Shortage of Marriageable Men?, 57 AM. Soc. REV. 781 (1992) (finding that alter-
ing sex ratios so as to give black women the same number of potential partners as white women
would increase marriage among African-Americans by about 25%). See also Francine M. Blau
et al., Understanding Young Women's Marriage Decisions, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 624
(2002); Megan M. Sweeney, Two Decades of Family Change: The Shifting Economic
Foundations of Marriage, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 132 (2002).
94. See also PATTERSON, supra note 52, at 63 (summarizing evidence and concluding that
economic explanations do not "adequately account[ ] for the low and declining marriage rates
[of Afro-Americans]").
95. See Moffitt, supra note 70, at 317; W.A. Darity & S.L. Myers, Family Structure and the
Marginalization of Black Men: Policy Implications, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE AMONG
AFRICAN AMERICANS 263 (M.B. Tucker & C. Mitchell-Keman eds. 1995).
96. See W.E.B. DuBols, THE NEGRO-AMERICAN FAMILY (1908).
97. See LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS
OF CONTROVERSY (1967).
98. See PATTERSON, supra note 52, at 25-53; WILSON, supra note 90, at 107-29.
99. Male slaves were often forced to live apart from their families; even when living with
his family, a man could offer his wife and children "no security, no status, no name, no identi-
ty." PATTERSON, supra note 52, at 32-34.
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ory, the slavery hypothesis has some explanatory power: nonmarriage and
nonmarital birth have been prominent in the African-American communi-
ty throughout the census reports, far more prominent than among the gen-
eral population or even other relatively poor ethnic groups; nonmarriage
and nonmarital birth are also extremely common among African-American
slave descendants in the Caribbean."° But assuming that the legacy of
slavery has played some role in producing black Americans' low marriage
and high nonmarital birth rates, we cannot assess the magnitude of that
role. Indeed, over the past fifty years, nonmarital births have actually
increased far more dramatically among whites than among blacks.,0 The
trend toward nonmarriage, cohabitation, and nonmarital birth is also visi-
ble across most of the developed world.
One reason why neither economic nor cultural explanations can fully
explain current trends is simply that economic and cultural factors appear
to interact. Indeed, the evidence suggests that each of these factors has the
potential to reinforce-or diminish-the power of the other. Consider
Matt, a twenty-seven-year-old cohabiting construction worker whose
remarks about marriage illustrate, in the view of the sociologists who
interviewed him, both the ways in which cultural schemas "sometimes
contradict each other" and the interaction between cultural and economic
variables. Two months after "Matt" met "Kate," they began cohabiting
because Matt needed a place to stay:
R: I had my own apartment, and then my lease was up and I didn't want to sign
a new lease because I knew I was going to Wisconsin, so she was like, "Well,
you can stay at my mom's until you go." And I was like, "OK."
I: Um, okay. How'd you come to the decision for her to move with you?
R: Um, just fell in love, and said, you know, "Come with me," and that was
kind of cool that she did.1 °2
In the researchers' view, "Matt's case . . . illustrates how financial
resources and schema about required economic underpinnings of mar-
riage and the male provider role interact to shape behaviors.. ." Moreover,
At one and the same time, Matt is in love with Kate and thus wishes to marry
her while simultaneously expressing that he is comfortable, in no hurry, and
100. Id. at 60-62 (showing marital disruption rates by ethnicity); WILSON, supra note 90, at
109-112, 114-15.
101. See Daniel P. Moynihan, The Dahrendorf Inversion and the Twilight of the Family: A
Challenge to the Conference, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at xiii, xvii (report-
ing that between 1960 and 2002, black nonmarital births increased from 24% to 69% of total
births (283%) while white nonmarital births increased from 3% to 23% (766%)).
102. Pamela J. Smock et al., Heterosexual Cohabitation in the United States: Motives for
Living Together Among Young Men and Women 33-34, Bowling Green State Univ. Working
Paper 06-10 (2006).
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that marriage is "just a piece of paper" and really the same as cohabitation. But
he also invokes a masculine schema that one should propose to the woman one
is living with, and references masculine scripts about the advantage of the
lower commitment required in cohabitation compared to marriage and the cur-
tailed freedom associated with living with a romantic partner. 10 3
Matt's confused explanations "demonstrate[] how people draw on frag-
ments of cultural schemas that sometimes contradict each other when
accounting for and making sense of their situations."'"° Matt's confused
explanations also suggest that economic and cultural forces are deeply and
ineluctably intertwined.
Because individual attitudes and behavior are compounded of a murky
mix of economic and cultural factors, so are those of larger groups and
geographic regions. Consider the fascinating case of Quebec, where the
marriage rate is about half that of the other Canadian provinces 1°5 and the
proportion of adults living in nonmarital relationships double the propor-
tion in the rest of Canada. 06 Indeed, the cohabitation rate in Quebec is vir-
tually identical to that of Sweden, where cohabitation has long been cul-
turally accepted and which has long had a cohabitation rate near the top
of the charts.'0 7 A half century ago, this pattern was quite different.
Indeed, Quebec's marriage rate at that time was higher and its divorce rate
lower than the Canadian norm.'0 8
Varying economic conditions probably explain some of this large
divergence. Quebec has historically had a high unemployment rate and
duration compared to most of the other Canadian provinces;'0 9 the Quebec
unemployment rate also rose more than 120% between 1966 and 1981, 10
103. Id. at 35-36.
104. Id. at 35.
105. See Statistics Canada, 2003 Marriage Rates, http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/
070117/d070117a.htm (showing marriage rates of 2.9 per 1000 population in Quebec and rates
of 4.9 (Manitoba) or higher in all other Canadian provinces except the frontier provinces of
Nunavit and Northwest Territories).
106. See Rejean Lachapelle, The High Prevalence of Cohabitation Among Franco-phones:
Some Implications for Exogamous Couples, paper presented at 2007 annual meeting of the
Canadian Population Society (2007); Benoit Laplante, The Rise of Cohabitation in Quebec:
Power of Religion and Power Over Religion, 31 CAN. J. SOC. 1 (2006).
107. See Lachapelle, supra note 106 (reporting that 29.8% of all Quebec couples were
cohabitants in 2001, and that 30% of all Swedish couples were cohabitants in 2000).
108. See Celine Le Bourdais & Nicole Marcil-Gratton, Family Transformations Across the
Canadian/American Border: When the Laggard Becomes the Leader, 28 J. COMP. FAM. STUD.
415 (1996).
109. See 2 B.C. MINISTRY OF SOC. & ECON. DEV., HOMELESSNESS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS 85
fig.3 (2006), http://www.housing.gov.bc.ca/housing/homelessVol2-Ch7.pdf (showing unem-
ployment rates by province for 1988-98).
110. See Hugues J. Cormier & Gerald L. Klerman, Unemployment and Male-Female Labor
Force Participation as Determinants of Changing Suicide Rates of Males and Females in
Quebec, 20 Soc. PSYCH. & EPIDEMIOLOGY 109 (1984).
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the period in which the marriage rate began to decline sharply.
Researchers have also found that Quebec's high unemployment rate is
significantly linked to its comparatively high suicide rate."'
However, Quebec's current occupational distribution, family income,
and dependency ratios are comparable or better than those of neighboring
provinces, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia," 12 whereas the marriage rate
of these provinces is 1.8 times higher that that of Quebec.' ' Some demog-
raphers have thus argued that the primary explanation for Quebec's low
marriage rate is cultural, more specifically its citizens' attitude toward
religion:
[T]he rise of cohabitation [and decline of marriage] in Quebec can be explained
by the fact that almost all of its French speaking population was Catholic, and
•.. the Church's refusal to change its doctrine on marriage and sexuality...
provided Quebec Catholics with the motive to abandon the traditional Christian
norms in these matters; the local Catholic authorities' withdrawal from the
institutions that framed people's lives "from cradle to grave" [during the late
60s] made it possible to actually abandon these norms.... In other words, the
Catholic Church in Quebec gave up its power over these institutions, its most
obvious and effective means of controlling its members, at the same time as the
Holy See was tightening its control over the definition of right and wrong, and
using it to ensure that the doctrine would not change. With Quebec's Catholic
Church ... no longer able to enforce this dogma this created a situation invit-
ing Quebecers to act as though it was no longer relevant. Given the circum-
stances, Quebecers chose to accept the invitation, and treated it as irrelevant.'114
Religion does seem to be a powerful factor in explaining Quebec's
unusually high cohabitation rate; Francophone, predominantly Catholic
Canadians have a higher cohabitation rate than Anglophone, predomi-
111. See Cormier & Klerman, supra note 110 (finding that economic fluctuations, as indexed
by annual changes in the unemployment rate, were associated with changes in the suicide rate
for males and females from 1966 to 1981 and concluding that "[e]conomic fluctuations are one
of the important social factors that may have contributed to the increase in suicide rates in
Quebec from 1966 to 1981"). See also Catherine Krull & Frank Trovato, The Quiet Revolution
and the Sex Differential in Quebec's Suicide Rates: 1931-1986, 72 Soc. FORCES 1121 (1994).
During the mid-1990s, Quebec continued to have the highest suicide rate among the Canadian
provinces. See Table 1.4.19.3 Suicide (ICD-9 E950-E959), age-standardized rate per 100,000
population and confidence interval, by sex, Canada, provinces, territories, and health regions,
1996, http://www50.statcan.ca/english/freepub/82-22 1-XIE/00601 /tables/pdftablesfP1 4193.
pdf. Curiously, in a survey in the mid-90s, Quebeckers rated their self-esteem higher than did
Canadians from other provinces. http://www50.statcan.ca/english/freepub/82-221-XIE/00601/
stat l.htm#wb2.
112. See Federal Reserve Bank of Boston New England Policy Ctr., Economic Similarities
Between Maine and Neighboring Canadian Provinces (2007), http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/
neppc/memos/2007/nagowski030107.pdf.
113. See Statistics Canada, supra note 105.
114. Laplante, supra note 106, at 1, 14.
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nantly Protestant Canadians no matter where they live in Canada. 15
However, Anglophone Canadians who live in Quebec also have a higher
cohabitation rate than Anglophones who live in the other provinces." 6
This might be the result of economic factors, or it might be the result
of majority Francophone sentiment influencing minority Anglophone
attitudes.
The possibility that Anglophone Quebeckers have been influenced by
the anti-Catholic views of their Francophone neighbors is a particularly
intriguing one. While highly relevant to Catholic Francophones, the
actions of the Catholic Church are not, of course, personally relevant to
non-Catholic Anglophones. But "bandwagon" effects often play an impor-
tant role in determining public opinion, and public opinion, over time,
plays an important role in determining private attitudes and behavior."7
A set of British experiments demonstrates just how large this band-
wagon effect can be. The researchers gave two sets of research subjects,
all unaware of the research experiment, information about public attitudes
toward abortion. One group was told that public attitudes were becoming
more permissive, the other that public attitudes were becoming more dis-
approving. When their own views were solicited, twelve percent more of
the first group expressed opposition to tightening restrictions on abor-
tion.' 8 In other words, a perception about public opinion appears to have
swayed the opinions of more than ten percent of the research subjects.
And "[e]ach new person on [an] . . .upward bandwagon induces addi-
tional people to climb on."'' 9
Of course, the mere fact that individuals expect their own position to be
a minority view does not necessarily make them abandon it. Individuals
with strongly held opinions will typically hold to their preferences,
particularly if those opinions are key to their identities as members of a
particular group.'2° But most of us can be swayed by our expectations
about the views of others, with the result that a major shift in public atti-
tudes can complete its course with remarkable speed. Professor Kuran
offers the attitudinal shift that followed the Indira Gandhi's declaration of
115. See Lachappelle, supra note 106.
116. See id.
117. The "bandwagon" phenomenon is the subject of a large literature. See generally
THOMAS C. SCHELLLNG, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978); STEPHEN R.G. JONES, THE
ECONOMICS OF CONFORMISM (1984); JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY
(1990). See also TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 69-82 (1995).
118. See Catherine Marsh, Back on the Bandwagon: The Effect of Opinion Polls on Public
Opinion, 15 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 51 (1984).
119. KuRAN, supra note 117.
120. The Amish represent an excellent example of this phenomenon.
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a state of emergency as an example of this phenomenon
In 1975, right before [Gandhi declared a state of emergency,] . . . the streets
were teeming with anti-government agitators confidently vowing never to give
up. In this atmosphere, the opposition leader J.P. Narayan asked an animated
audience of students whether they would go to class or to prison. "Prison!" they
shouted in unison. Then came the Emergency and the round-up of opposition
leaders. With hopes of revolution fading, millions quietly returned to their
classes within a matter of weeks. Evidently, the Emergency altered the dynam-
ics of public opinion by making it seem that Gandhi's government would man-
age, after all, to hold onto power and regain public support.
12 1
Closer to the topic at hand, public opinion about marriage and divorce
changed quite dramatically during the 1960s and 1970s. In the early
1960s, eighty percent of the public agreed that "a couple should stay
together" for the sake of the children. By the 1980s agreement with this
statement had dropped to fifty percent.
22
Of course, public attitudes toward cohabitation have also been shifting.
Describing their interviews with British cohabitants, Barlow and James
report that
[d]ecisions [about marriage] are now seen as purely personal life-style choices.
... [T]he social and cultural norms which made people feel that they ... ought
to get married in order to be accepted as a decent member of society seem to
have disappeared. 1
23
And-just as in the case of abortion-if individuals believe that public
opinion about formal marriage is increasingly dismissive, individuals
without strongly held views on the subject may well become more dis-
missive themselves. The interviews described by Professor Eekelaar in his
contribution to this symposium seem to evidence this tendency to parrot
the perceived norm; some of the interviewees seem almost embarrassed
about their decision to marry, and a number seem eager to pin their deci-
sion to marry on another person, such as a traditional parent.
24
It thus seems likely that public opinion trends and their tendency to
produce bandwagon effects has played a major role in promoting the
decline of marriage in Quebec. It also seems likely that these factors are
important determinants of cross-national and ethnic variation in marriage
121. KURAN, supra note 117, at 72.
122. See Larry Bumpass, The Changing Context of Parenting in the United States, http://par-
enthood.library.wisc.edu/Bumpass/Bumpass.html. Since then, public opinion has remained
remarkably stable. See Axinn & Thornton, supra note 59, at tbl.8.2 (showing that 19.6%
(1970s), 17.9% (1980s), and 17.3% (1990s) of respondents agreed or were neutral toward the
statement "parents should stay together even if they do not get along.")
123. Barlow & James, supra note 1, at 160.
124. See Eekelaar, infra at 413 (indicating that "the largest single category" of reasons
offered for marrying represented complying with social convention).
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and cohabitation norms.
In sum, the decline of marriage is almost certainly the result of several
interlinked factors. We can confidently say that the likelihood of marriage
is affected by economic factors, including male-to-female sex ratios,
employment and earnings patterns. We can also confidently say that mar-
riage decision-making is affected by cultural expectations and the sexual,
reproductive, and family-formation norms that these expectations induce.
Although we lack the capacity to assess the relative importance of econom-
ic and cultural factors on the individual, group, or societal level, we do
know that the trends set in motion by either economic or cultural conditions
can produce bandwagon effects that magnify their impact and may ulti-
mately-sometimes quite suddenly-produce much larger changes in atti-
tudes and behavior than the underlying sources of the trend would suggest.
V. What Should Policymakers Do?
Because the decline of marriage results from a number of different fac-
tors, policymakers face large difficulties in reversing the trend. These pol-
icy-making difficulties are magnified because the personal benefits of
marriage are concentrated in long-term, harmonious marital relationships.
Initiatives that encourage couples with weak, highly conflicted relation-
ships to enter into formal marriage along with those who have strong,
unconflicted relationships may foster the signaling function of marriage
but cannot produce significant gains in adult or child well-being. Ideally,
then, public policy would encourage couples to defer marriage-formal or
informal-and childbearing until they have determined that their relation-
ship has good prospects for long-term success. It would also encourage
them to enter into formal, ceremonial marriage when and if they make a
positive determination about their long-term prospects. Achieving a result
this nuanced is obviously very difficult given the range of variables that
appear to affect marital decision-making and our limited understanding of
how those variables work together.
Nuance aside, even a simpler agenda such as increasing the overall mar-
riage rate would be a large and very difficult undertaking. As an example
of the problems that policymakers will confront, consider the problem of
"lowest-low" fertility, which now afflicts at least seventeen European
nations that collectively contain half of the continent's population.'25
Lowest-low fertility refers to a fertility rate of 1.3 lifetime births per
woman or fewer, a rate that necessarily produces a halving of the popula-
125. See Hans-Peter Kohler et al., Low Fertility in Europe: Causes, Consequences, and
Policy Implications, in THE BABY BUST: WHO WILL Do THE WORK? WHO WILL PAY THE TAXES?
(F.R. Harris ed., 2006).
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tion within forty-five years and all of the social and economic dislocations
that such a dramatic decline would produce. Demographers agree that
lowest-low fertility, like the decline of marriage, is the product of eco-
nomic and cultural factors in combination; they also agree that the impact
of these factors is enhanced by "social feedback" effects that "can produce
rapid, persistent and generally irreversible delays in childbearing across a
wide range of socioeconomic conditions."' 26 Reversing lowest-low fertil-
ity does not demand nuanced results; it simply demands an increase in the
birth rate.
Lowest-low fertility is also a dramatic social problem-no one wants
to see a nation's population decline by fifty percent-capable of produc-
ing a strong and bipartisan public-policy response. Indeed, the affected
nations have already begun to respond and have adopted a wide range of
incentives-tax advantages, cash benefits, child-care subsidies and oppor-
tunities, parental leave, new employment policies-aimed at encouraging
women to have more babies. Studies of these policies have reached mixed
conclusions as to their impact. However, a fairly recent review of the
research reports that the evidence supports only a "weak" relationship
between these various incentives and reproductive behavior; it concludes
that policymakers "should not expect too much from pronatalist policies,"
particularly given that current knowledge is inadequate to guide the
design of optimal interventions.'27 If policymakers can expect only limit-
ed results from large-scale incentives aimed at the straightforward goal of
producing more births, one must assume that they can expect even more
limited results from incentives aimed at increasing marriage and marital
birth rates.
That public policy initiatives can produce only limited results does not
mean that they are unimportant. Public policy may make a difference at the
margins. And, as Professor Kuran's description of the public-opinion shift
occasioned by Gandhi's declaration of emergency makes clear, a change in
public policy can have a substantial impact on public opinion and thus
holds the potential to itself create a bandwagon shift in public attitudes.
Policymakers need to be careful that they do not inadvertently trigger a
bandwagon effect that promotes the decline of marriage by adopting mis-
guided initiatives that negatively affect public opinion about marriage.
126. See id.
127. JOELLE E. SLEEBOS, Low FERTILITY RATES IN OECD COUNTRIES: FACTS AND POLICY
RESPONSES 49 (OECD Social, Employment, & Migration Working Paper No. 15, 2003,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l3/38/16587241.pdf). See also Hans-Peter Kohler et al., Low
and Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe: Causes, Implications and Policy Options (Pop. Assoc. of
America Ann. Mtg, 2006), http://paa2006.princeton.edu/abstractViewer.aspx?submissionld=
60220.
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Given these concerns, shifts in the law that assimilate some cohabita-
tional relationships to marriage would appear to be particularly undesir-
able. These shifts seem to be motivated, in large part, by the sense that
women in long-term cohabitational relationships are disadvantaged at
relationship dissolution as compared to their married peers and aim at
reducing that disadvantage.' 28 Some such schemes rely on individualized
fact-finding; others, more numerous, rely on the duration of cohabitation
or the birth of a common child. The individualized schemes recreate and
exaggerate the fact-finding problems inherent in the common-law mar-
riage doctrine; the durational and common-child approaches resolve some
of the fact-finding difficulties of the individualized schemes but reduce
individual autonomy and risk the imposition of obligations on individuals
who lack marital understandings or-worse-who have affirmatively
chosen to avoid marital obligations by remaining single. 129 Although these
reasons alone should deter policymakers from initiating such "conscrip-
tive" regulatory schemes, policymakers inclined toward this type of ini-
tiative should additionally consider the fact that conscriptive schemes not
so subtly signal that the decision to marry is unimportant. Such a signal
has the potential to contribute to the perception that public support for for-
mal marriage is declining and thus to trigger exactly that.
Schemes to promote marriage through direct financial incentives are
less likely to trigger undesirable bandwagon effects, but they also appear
to be misguided. Marriage is a valuable social institution both because of
its signaling function and the health, wealth, and happiness that it offers
to adult partners and their children. But financial incentives distort mari-
tal decision-making and may produce, at high enough levels, sham mar-
riages that reduce marriage's capacity to signal intention or to provide
personal benefits. Financial incentives aimed at the very poor are thus
particularly ill-advised as individuals who need money badly are more
likely to be swayed by monetary inducements.' 30
Policies that establish marriage penalties are also undesirable as these,
too, create distorting incentives and may deter couples with marital inten-
tions from formalizing their relationship in order to evade these penalties.
Over time, marriage evasion, like conscriptive rules, can reduce marriage's
capacity to accurately signal intention and contribute to the perception that
formal marriage is not a meaningful step. 3'
128. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 7 at p. 873-74.
129. See id. at 848-64 (reviewing evidence).
130. For a more detailed account of problems associated with marriage incentives, see
Garrison, supra note 6.
131. For a more detailed account of problems associated with marriage penalties, see
Garrison, supra note 6.
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On the other hand, policies that neutrally, but sharply, distinguish mar-
riage from cohabitation appear to be warranted and appropriate. These
policies reinforce the perception that marriage is not just a piece of paper
and thus encourage both thoughtful marital decisions and decisions that
segregate those with marital intentions from those without such inten-
tions. These policies may also reinforce public opinion in favor of formal
marriage for those with marital intentions and childbearing within such
relationships.
In the United States, policies aimed at reducing the social disadvan-
tages that are strongly associated with nonmarriage and nonmarital birth
also appear to be valuable. Indeed, the strong and consistent association
between disadvantage and the failure to marry is large enough that it is not
obvious that the state can effectively promote marriage without such poli-
cies. As Professor Wax explains in her contribution to this symposium,
the increasing class divergence in family formation norms contributes to
increased income inequality and enhances the disadvantages associated
with growing up in a low-income family.' 32 Moreover, the research data
shows that the same disadvantages that appear to promote nonmarriage
and nonmarital childbearing also promote divorce'3 3 and an enormous
array of problems in family functioning. For example, child maltreatment
is highly concentrated among disadvantaged families: a U.S. national
incidence study found that children from families with annual incomes
below $15,000 were sixty times more likely to die from maltreatment and
twenty-two times more likely to be seriously harmed by it than were chil-
dren from families with annual incomes above $30,000. i'3 Single and
adolescent parenting, substance abuse, mental health problems, adult fam-
ily violence, and lack of social supports are all highly correlated with
child maltreatment;' 35 these various maltreatment-risk factors are also
132. See Wax, infra. p. 567.
133. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STUDIES IN HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY FORMATION:
WHEN HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE, DISCONTINUE, AND FORM 18-21 (CURRENT POPUL. REP. Series P-
23 No. 180, 1992) (reporting that divorce is twice as common among those living below the
poverty line as compared with the general population rate). See also WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD
CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATrERNS 154-55 (1993) (summarizing research on relationship between
socioeconomic class and divorce rates); Zimmermann & Easterlin, supra note 17 (finding that
those whose marriages break up have lower average socioeconomic status).
134. See A.J. SEDLAK & D.D. BROADHURST, THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT (U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs., 1996). Extreme poverty also tends to
be associated with more extreme abuse and neglect. See COMMISSION ON BEHAVIORAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES & EDUCATION, LOSING GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS IN HIGH-RISK SETrINGS 19
(1993) (summarizing studies).
135. See Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA.
J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 590, 613-15 (2005) (summarizing research).
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highly correlated with each other and with low socioeconomic status.136
Initiatives designed to reduce the disadvantages that promote nonmarriage
and nonmarital childbearing thus hold the potential to improve relational
quality and family functioning as well as to promote formal marriage. For
example, high-quality, intensive preschool education is significantly asso-
ciated not only with long-term educational and social advantages, but also
with a lower rate of child maltreatment and teen pregnancy. 137
Policymakers should certainly look for initiatives that hold the potential
to produce similar synergistic effects.
In sum, although policymakers can expect only limited results from ini-
tiatives designed to promote formal marriage, well-designed policies that
promote the socioeconomic conditions in which successful marriage
flourishes, reduce economic disincentives to marry, and offer clear divid-
ing lines between formal marriage and cohabitation are all supported by
the evidence. These policies do not have the capacity to bring back the
world in which marriage and marital childbearing were almost universal,
but they may have the capacity to make a difference at the margins. They
do not appear to hold any potential for causing harm. And they may also
promote other improvements in family relationships and functioning.
136. See id. at 615 (summarizing research); CHILDREN IN POVERTY: CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND
PUBLIC POLICY 23-156 (Aletha C. Huston ed. 1993) (summarizing research on links between
poverty, parental dysfunction, and poor child outcomes).
137. See, e.g, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HEAD
START RESEARCH, EVALUATING HEAD START: A RECOMMENDED FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE
IMPACT OF THE HEAD START PROGRAM, http://www2.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/hsb/research/
hsreac/1999report/chapter3.htm; A.J. Reynods & D.L. Robertson, School-Based Early
Intervention and Later Child Maltreatment in the Chicago Longitudinal Study, 74 CHILD DEV.
3 (2003); A.J. Reynods et al., School-Based Early Intervention and Child Well-Being in the
Chicago Longitudinal Study, 82 CHILD WELFARE 633 (2003).
